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Abstract
Opinion dynamics have fascinated researchers for centuries. The
ability of societies to learn as well as the emergence of irrational herd-
ing are equally evident. The simplest example is that of agents that
have to determine a binary action, under peer pressure coming from
the decisions observed. By modifying several popular models for opin-
ion dynamics so that agents internalize actions rather than smooth
estimates of what other people think, we are able to prove that almost
surely the actions final outcome remains random, even though actions
can be consensual or polarized depending on the model. This is a the-
oretical confirmation that the mechanism that leads to the emergence
of irrational herding behavior lies in the loss of nuanced information
regarding the privately held beliefs behind the individuals decisions.
Mathematical models of herding phenomena prove the old saying that
actions speak louder than words. A classical result shows that sequential
Bayesian learners give rise to dysfunctional information cascades because of
the overwhelming effect of the actions that are observed. In this work we
demonstrate that a variety of popular opinion dynamics models, modified so
that the agents internalize the effect of random actions rather than smooth
estimates their peers beliefs, create herding, polarized groups or do not
converge to a fixed belief. Because of the generality of our analysis, our
work cements the notion that actions are poor representations of private
information and lead to unpredictable social herding phenomena.
There is a vast literature on the subject of opinion dynamics, aimed at
modeling how beliefs propagate across a social fabric. In the late 1700s [1]
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first noted that averaging individuals’ beliefs would, by the law of large num-
bers, lead to a noise free average opinion and precise estimate in the limit [1],
a concept later popularized broadly in the early 1900’s [2]. The models used
to derive these insights are very similar to the Bayesian multi-agent models
that are pervasive in signal processing [3, 4, 5]. While in signal processing
decision criteria are often based on minimizing the expected Bayesian risk,
in economics, the decision model of rational agents has been long modeled
as maximizing the expected utility in the Bayesian sense. Furthermore, a
substantial body of the economics literature assumes that agents reveal im-
perfectly their private beliefs through their utility maximizing action. The
seminal paper by Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (BHW) [6] (see also
[7]) highlighted how pathologies, called informational cascades, seem to de-
velop when agents make a zero-one decisions (for example, zero is “bad”
and one is “good”), instead of averaging continuous values as in [2]. The
BHW paper highlights the significant impact of processing discrete actions,
as opposed to continuous belief values, on the final behavior of the group.
This impact leads to what is often referred to as herding behavior [8]. Other
opinion diffusions models and interactions of agents in social networks are
reviewed in e.g. [9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14].
In the last forty years, a flurry of models for opinion dynamics has
emerged in the statistical physics literature [12], inspired by ideas aimed
at predicting macroscopic behavior that emerges from simple random par-
ticles interactions. Among them the voter model, introduced in [15], is one
of the simplest non-ergodic opinion diffusion models that leads to herding.
This more closely resemble the zero-one interactions in [6] since the agents
have two discrete opinions and copy at random one of their neighbors. This
model was later mapped onto that of random walkers that coalesce upon
encounter by Liggett [16, 17] which made it analytically tractable. An in-
teresting variant is the one introduced by Mobilia in [18] where, using a
mean-field approach, the author studied the effect of having stubborn agents
in the network that, by not changing their opinion, attempt to influence the
final equilibrium point. In recent work [19, 20, 21] re-examined this question
and analytically characterized its behavior by generalizing the approach in-
troduced by Liggett and providing a solution for the strategic placement of
stubborn agents in the voter model. Stubborn agents were also considered
by Jia et al. [22]
Sznajd and coauthors in [23] considered a different discrete opinion dy-
namic in which it takes two agents to convince their neighbors of the cor-
rectness of their opinion. By contrast, Galam in [24], proposed a variant in
which the opinions of the agents switched to the prevalent opinion (a ma-
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jority rule) in their neighborhood. Since Sznajd dynamics are a special case
of the general sequential probabilistic model (GPM) in [25], only two differ-
ent phases are possible: either consensus, or coexistence of the two opinions
in equal proportions. Interestingly, in the presence of stubborn agents with
asynchronous updates, opinion fluctuations exist and convergence is not cer-
tain [26].
Continuous belief models and updates, even in the presence of non-
linearities (e.g. bounded confidence) are also a popular way to model so-
cial dynamics of opinions. A popular form is the Hegselmann-Krause (HK)
model (or the bounded confidence (BC) model) [27, 28], where opinions are
represented by a real number and are updated synchronously, by averaging
all the agents’ opinions that differ by less than a confidence level  (set to 1
in [28]). As long as the network is connected, the agents reach a consensus
[29] with the average belief in the network. A randomized variant of the HK
was introduced by DeGroot in [30] and studied in e.g. [31, 32, 33, 34] in
which two randomly chosen neighbors meet and adjust their opinions only
when their opinion distance is below a threshold. These models lead either
to consensus or polarization, but opinions do converge.
Note that in the economics literature, due to the Bayesian update rule,
the agents have a continuous belief even if their action and decision variables
are discrete (the probability mass function of the decision variable given the
private information and history of the actions that were observed). Gener-
alizing the analysis in [6] to arbitrary social graphs is both intractable and
perhaps futile, given the ample evidence that social agents are not rational
[35].
In statistical physics the acronym CODA (continuous opinions discrete
actions) was coined much later in [36, 37]. This class of models follows the
general idea from economics of assuming that the agents internalize an es-
timate of the beliefs of the others obtained by observing their actions. But
contrary to the BHW model, CODA models postulate simple mechanisms of
opinion contagion, without offering significant detail on the interpretation of
the models and providing mostly numerical characterization of their asymp-
totic behavior. The strong guarantees and mathematical characterizations
of the limiting behavior is completely known only for the simple chain of
sequential interactions treated in [6].
Our main results is to offer strong theoretical guarantees that the same
emergent behavior of random herding in the BHW model holds more broadly.
Our work supports the argument that it is the discrete and random nature
of what the agents internalize about the beliefs held by their neighbors that
produces the formation of random herds, i.e. herds whose final decision out-
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come that cannot be predicted with certainty and is, potentially, nefariously
wrong.
1 Consensus under the social pressure of actions
We assume each agent has only two options to chose from, and we label them
choice 0 and choice 1. Assume these choices are made by flipping a coin that
is biased by a belief variable xn(t), generating an action an(t) ∈ {0, 1}. For
each n, an(t) is a Bernoulli random variable with probability xn(t).
To capture the agents’ tendency to conform to social norms, we assume
that the agents perturb their belief xn(t) by moving towards the weighted
mean of their neighbors actions. The agents update their belief as a convex
combination of the frequency of action 1 over their neighborhood and their
prior belief, i.e.:
xn(t+ 1) = (1− α)xn(t) + α
∑N
k=1wnkak(t) (1)
where wnk is a weight function corresponding to the relative weight that
agent n gives to the action of agent k if (n, k) is and edge and zero otherwise.
We also require that
∑
k wn,k = 1. We require that the matrix W defined
by: will be the transition matrix of an irreducible Markov chain but we
do not require wn,n = 0 since it might be that agent n is influenced by its
own action (even though it is random and determined by its internal belief
xn(t). Basic results from spectral graph theory show that this condition is
equivalent to having a network that has a single component, where we have
weighted edges between agents n, k whenever wn,k 6= 0. Note that xn(t) is
always an number in [0, 1] and assuming that not all xn(0) are identically 0 or
identically 1, we may assume without loss of generality that they are strictly
between 0 and 1 (since this will happen with probability 1 in finite time by
the averaging property). Introducing the vectors x(t) = (x1(t), . . . , xN (t))
T
and a(t) = (a1(t), . . . , aN (t)) we note that:
E{a(t)|x(t)} = x(t), (2)
and
Cov{a(t)|x(t)} = diag {v1(t), ..., vn(t)} (3)
where vj(t) = xj(t)(1− xj(t)) is the variance of agent j at time t. Further-
more,
Pr (a(t) = a|x(t)) =
N∏
n=1
xann (t)(1− xn(t))(1−an). (4)
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The value of α determines the influence of the actions on the belief of each
agent1. Let us define also the matrix W which has elements wm,n and define
Wα = (1− α)I+ αW. (5)
We note that for all 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 both W and Wα are stochastic matrices
with the same right and left eigenvectors, and spectral radius 1. Let pi be
the left eigenvector of W corresponding to the largest eigenvalue 1 (nor-
malized such that 1Tpi = 1) and remember that the corresponding right
eigenvector is 1. By the Perron-Frobenius theorem we have pi >> 0, i.e. all
its components are strictly positive. Denoting by
J , 1piT , (6)
By standard theory of stochastic matrices for all α the spectral radius of
Wα − J 0 < ρ(Wα − J) < 1 and WαJ = J. Introducing the vectors
x(t) = (x1(t), . . . , xN (t))
T and a(t) = (a1(t), . . . , aN (t)), we can also note
that (1) can be written in vector form as follows:
x(t+ 1) = (1− α)x(t) + αWa(t) (7)
From (7) it is straightforward to prove the following:
Lemma 1 In general E{x(t+ 1)|x(t)} = Wαx(t) and E{Jx(t+ 1)|x(t)} =
Jx(t).
The proof of the lemma is provided in the supplementary material. This
lemma clarifies the connection with the classic opinion dynamics model in-
troduced by DeGroot [30], which is identical to our model in expectation.
The weights in the matrixWα in the DeGroot model typically areinterpreted
as being the trust individuals place on each other. The average dynamics are
also a classic example of the so called Average Consensus Gossiping (AGC)
algorithms [38]. For a connected network is well known that these dynamics
lead to consensus on the state. Note however (7) is not deterministic and
the fact that actions are discrete leads to very different dynamics than AGC
as the following lemma shows:
Lemma 2 The network has only two stationary states: x(t) = 1 and x(t) =
0.
1We assume that α is independent of n for notational simplicity, but all arguments go
through even when αn depends on the player.
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Proof: It is clear that in both cases, x(t) = 0 or x(t) = 1, if we evaluate (4)
for x(t) = 0 Pr (a(t) = 0|0) = 1 and x(t) = 1 Pr (a(t) = 1|1) = 1. This
implies (7) leads to a fixed point x(t+ 1) = x(t). Any other belief level will
place a non-zero probability in all a(t + 1) ∈ {0, 1}N therefore making it
possible to deviate from the previous belief for every α > 0.
Interestingly, the fact that there are stationary states, does not suffice
to prove that the beliefs indeed converge to the stationary states. This
convergence is the main result. Denote the expected value of x(t) by µx(t):
µx(t) = E{x(t)}. (8)
Let the network weighted sample average of the beliefs according to the
stationary distribution pi at time t be:
q(t) = piTx(t). (9)
The next lemma leverages results in the AGC literature [38]:
Lemma 3 The expected value in (8) is such that
lim
t→+∞µx(t) = E{q(0)}1. (10)
The simple proof of this lemma is relegated to the supplementary material
for brevity. While this property is not surprising, what is interesting is the
following result:
Theorem 1 The mechanism in (1) leads to herding, i.e.
∀n, Pr
(
lim
t→∞xn(t) ∈ {0, 1}
)
= 1.
Moreover, the limit is identical to all agents, i.e., either all agents end up
with belief 0 or all of them end up with belief 1.
The first part of the proof of this lemma is similar to that used in [39] albeit
for a different opinion diffusion model to show that the process converges
to a random variable with probability 1. However, in contrast to [39], our
model leads to herding while their model leads almost surely to consensus
on the true value of the parameter. The second part resorts to the Lesbegue
dominated convergence theorem to prove that the limiting random variable
must be equal to either 0 or 1:
Proof: We know that the only stationary belief levels are x = 0 or x = 1,
since for every other vector there is a positive probability that the average
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action will cause a deviation up to α, however, in contrast to the voter’s
model this is insufficient, since when the initial state has all beliefs strictly
between 0 and 1, at any given stage the beliefs will be in the open interval
(0, 1) since they are convex combinations of the current belief with a num-
ber in [0, 1] and convergence is not achieved in finite time. Since W is a
stochastic matrix. Let q(t) = piTx(t) be the average belief level in the net-
work according to the stationary distribution of Wα. We will show that q(t)
is a martingale process with respect to the beliefs. To that end we observe
that:
q(t+ 1) = piTx(t+ 1) = piT [(1− α)x(t) + (αW)a(t)] . (11)
where a(t) is the action vector at times t. Computing the expectation of
both sides conditioned on x(t) we observe that:
E {q(t+ 1)|x(t)} = piTWαx(t) = piTx(t) = q(t), (12)
since pi is a left eigenvector of Wα with an eigenvalue equal to 1 and by
the Perron-Frobenius theorem all its elements are strictly positive, since the
network is connected (which is equivalent to the Markov chain defined by
W is irreducible. This implies that q(t) is a martingale with respect to
the sigma-algebra determined by the sequence of beliefs x(t). By definition
q(t) is a bounded sequence, as the weighted mean of a vector with elements
between 0 and 1. By the martingale convergence theorem the sequence q(t)
must converge to a random variable q∞ with probability 1. We need to show
that q∞ is almost surely either 0 or 1,
Consider now for t > 1 the sequence ∆q(t) = q(t) − q(t − 1), i.e. the
martingale difference sequence. For each t by the martingale property,
E {∆q(t)} = 0. (13)
Since pi is a probability vector and for all n, t 0 ≤ xn(t) ≤ 1 we have that
for all n, t |q(t)| < 1 as well as |∆q(t)| < 1. Therefore, by the almost sure
convergence of q(t)
lim
t→∞ var(∆q(t)) = 0, a.s. (14)
which implies that also
lim
t→∞ var(∆q(t)|q(t− 1)) = 0, a.s. (15)
Similarly ∆q(t) < 1 and converges almost surely to 0. Hence by the Lesbegue
dominated convergence theorem ∆q(t) converges to 0 in the mean square
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sense. If we express explicitly the conditional variance of ∆q(t)
var(∆q(t)|q(t− 1)) = E {∆q2(t)|q(t− 1)}
= α2
∑N
n=1 pi
2
nvar(an(t))
= α2
∑N
n=1 pi
2
nxn(t)(1− xn(t)).
(16)
Since for all n, pin > 0 the MS convergence implies that
lim
t→∞xn(t)(1− xn(t)) = 0 ∀ n. (17)
Simple probabilistic computation shows that either for all n
lim
t→∞xn(t) = 0 or limt→∞xn(t) = 1. (18)
In fact, if for some j, n which are connected, xn(t) converges to 1 while
xj(t) converges to 0, since the actions are independent, there will be with
probability 1 infinitely many deviations of at least min {|Wn,k| : wn,k 6= 0} of
both xn(t) and xj(t), contradicting the convergence of both xn(t) and xj(t).
This implies that herding must be achieved with probability 1, which
ends the proof of the main theorem.
It should be noted that while the limit variables xn(∞) have values
0, 1, each initial condition has a different probability of converging to 0 or
1, which implies that what outcomes prevails, wrong or right, is random
and therefore social pressure can lead to umpredictable collective behavior,
in spite of the initial information the agents have available to forge their
opinion. We would like to determine its distribution given an initial value
or a distribution of initial values. The next corollary will show that xn(∞) is
a binomial random variable with mean q(0). This implies that the variance
of xn(∞) is q(0) (1− q(0)). In fact, the combination of the lemma above
and the main theorem leads to the following corollary:
Corollary 1 Let x(0) be the agents’ initial belief level vector. The prob-
ability that the agents herd to action an(t) = 1 is q(0) = 1
Tx(0), i.e.
limt→+∞ Pr(xn(t) = 1) = q(0).
Proof: Since, as t→ +∞, the network can only be in one of the two fixed
points x(t) = 1 or x(t) = 0, the probability that it will endup on one of
these two states is, as indicated in Lemma 3, equal to the average initial
belief.
Interestingly, no matter what the initial state is, we cannot predict the
outcome of the herding for sure. No matter how close the population belief
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is to 0 or 1 initially, it is always possible that they will herd towards the op-
posite action. If it is indeed true that the social pressure mechanism is based
on internalizing the actions of one’s peers, we cannot predict accurately the
outcome of the social dynamics. Applying this to market behavior, where
people favor one product over the other, this indicates a quality brand that
has high probability of capturing a large percentage of the market if indi-
viduals were to choose in isolation, may actually fail and other firms with
worse products have a fighting chance to capture it. Furthermore, we can see
that even in large markets driven only by the consumers repeated actions,
a winner takes all cascade eventually happens, and one product wins the
majority of the market share irrespective of the initial individual evidence
to the quality of the product. This may not always be the case however.
In the next section we generalize our analysis first to random interactions
and show the same type of herding phenomenon happens as well in that
context. We also show that when social pressure is mitigated by mistrust
for what deviates excessively from ones prior belief, then the society may
split in multiple herds.
1.1 Randomized interactions
A simple variation of our model is one that captures random interactions
among the agents. In this case (1) becomes
xn(t+ 1) = (1− α)xn(t) + α
∑N
k=1wnk(t)ak(t) (19)
where the weights wnk(t) are non zero only for those individuals who ob-
serve and are affected by their peers actions in that particular epoch. We
assume wnk(t) are random processes independent from the actions the nodes
performed, which continue to be modeled as in the previous section. Cor-
respondingly, we can define the random matrices W(t) and Wα(t) as be-
fore. Interestingly this variation of the model hardly changes the result
and random herding ensues also in this case almost surely. Let us now
assume that these random matrices are ergodic processes and denote by
W = E{W(t)}. If all nodes will speak infinitely often with peers and the
average W = E{W(t)} is a stochastic matrix with eigenvalue 1 with multi-
plicity 1, then we can easily generalize the proof of our main theorem, using
the same definition of pi as before:
Corollary 2 The statement of Theorem 1 holds unchanged if the interac-
tions are random and W = E{W(t)}.
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Proof: In this case we define:
q(t) = piTx(t) (20)
In this case, like before:
E {q(t+ 1)|x(t)} = piTWαx(t) = piTx(t) = q(t), (21)
but now the average is also with respect to the process W(t). Nonetheless
everything else from this point on follows the steps of the proof of Theorem
1.
2 Bounded confidence models
2.1 Bounded confidence under the influence of actions
An interesting generalization of our model is the update with bounded-
confidence, where the n’th agent updates happen only where the obser-
vations are sufficiently close to the agent own disposition. A natural option
is to analyze a model similar to the HK model proposed in [27] for continu-
ous opinion dynamics. In the HK model, agents mix their belief only with
agents whose belief sufficiently close to their own. In our case, agents update
their belief only if the empirical distribution of the actions of its neighbors
is sufficiently close to xn(t). We introduce the function:
ρ(x) = αxu(|x| ≤ τ) (22)
in which the confidence threshold τ < 1 and u(x) is the Heaviside (i.e. the
unit step) function. The agent’s update with bounded confidence in its
neighbors is modeled as:
xn(t+ 1) = xn(t) + ρ
(
N∑
k=1
wnkak(t)− xn(t)
)
. (23)
We note right away that ρ(0−0) = ρ(1−1) = 0, which implies that x(t) = 1
or x(t) = 0 are, once again fixed points. Let us denote by:
Pn(x(t)) = P
(∣∣∣ N∑
k=1
wnkak(t)− xn(t)
∣∣∣ > τ ∣∣∣x(t)) (24)
Let:
αn(x(t)) = α(1− Pn(x(t))). (25)
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We can define a matrix W(x(t)) in the same way as (5), except that we
replace α with a diagonal matrix with diagonal elements αn(x(t)). It is
straightforward to see that
E{x(t+ 1)|x(t)} = W(x(t))x(t)
which are smooth non-linear dynamics equivalent to the HK model. In the
action-based HK dynamics a range of stationary beliefs are possible and, also
the beliefs may never converge even in distribution. In fact, next we provide
an example where the action-based HK model exhibits much more complex
behavior than the polarization phenomenon observed in the classical HK
model. Let us illustrate this fact with an example. Consider a network with
four nodes, with an initial beliefs vector x = (0, 0.45, 0.55, 1)T , a confidence
threshold τ = 0.25 and a mixing matrix:
W =

0 1 0 0
0.5 0 0.25 0.25
0.25 0.25 0 0.5
0 0 1 0
 . (26)
In this case the dynamics of the four nodes are as follows. For the first node:
x1(t+ 1) =
{
x1(t)+αu(|1−x1(t)| ≤ τ)(1−x1(t)) a2(t) = 1
x1(t)−αu(x1(t) ≤ τ)x1(t) a2(t) = 0 (27)
=
{
x1(t) = 0 a2(t) = 1
(1−α)x1(t) = 0 a2(t) = 0 (28)
and the reason why x1(t) = 0 is that we assumed that x1(0) = 0 and all
later values remain unchanged. Similarly, without giving a proof we can
show that x4(t) = 1 (just by symmetry 1 − x4(t) behaves like x1(t)). For
node number two, when update is activated, the node has a new state that
is a convex combination of x2(t) with either 0.25 or 0.5. Therefore:
(1− α)x2(t) + α 0.25 ≤ x2(t+ 1) ≤ (1− α)x2(t) + α 0.5 (29)
and, since the node starts at x2(0) = 0.45, the subsequent values will have
to remain confined in the interval (0.25, 0.5). For similar reasons x3(t) will
remain in the interval (0.5, 0.75). However, they both will change randomly.
In fact, x2(t) will change due to a3(t) and viceversa x3(t) will change based
on a2(t). Therefore no convergence in distribution is attained and the opin-
ions will continue to fluctuate indefinitely in the intervals discussed above.
This is shown numerically in the next section in Fig. 4.
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2.2 Reinforcement model with random pairwise interactions
We propose an alternative model for the update. We assume that if agents
n observe at random one of its neighbors, say the kth neighbor, make the
same decision, agent n will adjust the belief as follows:
xn(t+ 1) = xn(t) + αδ[an(t)− ak(t)](an(t)− xn(t)), (30)
where δ[x] is the Kronecker delta function.
We view this model as a mechanism that reinforces behavior, because it
tends to decrease or increase the belief based on the frequency with which
ones action is repeated in the neighborhood. In this case the only fixed points
for the dynamics x have integer entries, but unlike either (12) or (21), in this
case the network may never coalesce in taking a single action, but opposite
decisions may persist as well. The expectation of these dynamics given a
random pair (n, k) is:
E{xn(t+ 1)|x(t), (n, k)} = xn(t)[1− α(1− xn(t))(1− xk(t))]
≤ xn(t). (31)
Since this holds for each random choice of (n, k) we observe that from the
previous equations, taking the expectation also over the random choices of
(n, k) it is clear that the state is a sub-martingale:
E{xn(t+ 1)|x(t)} ≤ xn(t) (32)
Next we prove the following lemma:
Theorem 2 The mechanism in (30) leads to
∀n, Pr
(
lim
t→∞xn(t) ∈ {0, 1}
)
= 1.
but not necessarily herding, which in turn means society will be polarized in
general.
Proof: The argument follows a similar line of reasoning as our previous
theorem. Because of the dominated convergence theorem the state xn(t)
must converge in the mean square sense. We can see then that the sequence
ynk(t) = αδ[an(t)−ak(t)](an(t)−xn(t)) must go to zero in the mean square
sense, because each pair is selected at random infinitely often. This can
happen in only two cases, either the conditional variance of an(t) − xn(t)
goes to zero or δ[an(t) − ak(t)] = 0 with probability one. If we assume the
12
first is not true, then the second implies that the independent actions of the
random pair of agents are the same, which can only be if they have equal
probability xn(t) = xk(t) ∈ {0, 1}; while this cannot happen in finite time
it can happen at the limit. If this does not happen then the variance of
an(t) in the limit must be zero which again implies that in the limit the
probability converges to either 1 or 0. Both lead to the same conclusion,
which proves the theorem.
3 Simulated experiments
3.1 Consensus under the social pressure of actions
To demonstrate the herding and clustering phenomenon we proved to be
true in Section 1, we performed several Monte-Carlo trials. In the first
experiments we randomly picked a random sample graph shown in Figure
1.
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Figure 1: The random graph used for simulations.
Then we picked randomly 5000 initial vectors x(0) whose entries are
independent and drawn to have a mean ∀ n E{xn(0)} = p0 varying from 0.2
to 0.8 and chose uniform weights wkn = 1/deg(k), where deg(k) denotes the
degree of node k (the graph is undirected).
Figure 2 shows the histogram of the limit for various random realizations
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Figure 2: Histograms of the final belief for p0 = 0.2 and p0 = 0.6.
of the process for initial belief levels of p0 = 0.2, 0.6. Figure 3 shows clearly
that the actions are Bernoulli random variables whose parameter is correctly
predicted by the theorem.
3.2 Action-based HK model
In Figure 4 we simulated the dynamics discussed in Section 2 pertaining
four nodes with W in (26). Note that there is no agreement but also no
convergence of belief, in contrast to the classical HK model and the claims
made in Section 2 are corroborated by the simulation results. Furthermore
the random process of the opinions of the agents is very complex, as one can
notice from the complex non linear dynamics of the mean. This shows that
it is much harder to predict a form of polarization because the random pro-
cesses x2(t), x3(t) are governed by non-linear stochastic dynamics that are
Markovian but non homogeneous, whose trends are difficult to manipulate
mathematically to obtain optimum forecasts. Either than resorting to the
bounds we mentioned, accurate predictions become intractable, even when
the initial conditions are known.
3.3 Reinforcement model
In Section 2 we introduced a new model in which nodes move their belief
when their action is identical to one of their neighbors, selected at random.
In this case we showed that the network in Figure 1, with uniform initial
belief equal to 0.5, converges to possibly multiple herds. This is illustrated
in our three numerical simulation of the dynamics of the beliefs in Figure 5
where we can clearly observe the emergence of herding towards belief 1 and
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Figure 3: Mean and variance of the limit point as a function of p0.
belief 0 by all nodes in the top and bottom figures respectively, as well as
the emergence of polarized groups, whose belief is 1 or 0, in the middle plot.
This corroborate the statement in Theorem 2.
4 Conclusions
In this paper we examined an opinion diffusion model in which agents update
their belief based on their neighbors’ empirical distribution of the actions.
The use of the observed actions leads to herding unlike continuous state
updates when neither bounded confidence nor stubborn agents are present
in the system showing that the trend observed in the BHW model extends
to other settings.
5 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 3
We now prove prove Lemma 3 Taking the expectation on both sides of 7,
we obtain:
µx(t+ 1) = (1− α)E{x(t)}+ αWE{E{a(t)|x(t)}}
= Wαµx(t) = Wα
tµx(0)
(33)
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Figure 4: The state of the four node network with W in (26).
which is the AGC update that converges to consensus in the limit. In fact
lim
t→+∞W
t = J (34)
and
Jµx(0) = 1pi
Tµx(0) (35)
which proves the claim, since E{q(0)} = piTµx(0). In addition to the lemmas
and theorems in the main paper, the following result holds
Lemma 4 In general
E{x(t+ 1)|x(t)} = Wαx(t) (36)
and
E{Jx(t+ 1)|x(t)} = Jx(t). (37)
Proof:
E{x(t+ 1)|x(t)} = (1− α)x(t) + αWE{a(t+ 1)|x(t)}
= (1− α)x(t) + αWx(t) = Wαx(t). (38)
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Figure 5: Three experiments of the dynamics of the agents beliefs with same
initial beliefs that converge to herding (top 0 and bottom 1) and polarization
(middle).
The second claim follows easily since JWα = J. This shows that in expec-
tation the belief follows the same dynamics as the DeGroot model [30].
Simulations of herding under random pairwise interactions
We also tested the dynamics where each time two random nodes average
their actions, discussed in the Randomized interactions section, and use
the averaged action to update their mutual beliefs. Figure 6 describes the
random graph used. In this case we describe the course of two dynamics
of the population, both where all nodes had an initial belief of 0.9, i.e. all
nodes were very inclined to take action 1. The top Figure 7 presents a
dynamics converging to 1. We present the lowest belief, the highest belief
and the mean belief. As can be seen when the dynamics converge to 1 this
happens quite rapidly, because of the initial state of all nodes. The bottom
of Figure 7 presents another instance of the dynamics, where initial beliefs
were identical to the previous case, but the limiting value of the herding was
0. With the initial conditions defined in the simulation, this occurs only 10%
of the simulations. Still this is surprising, as it would be expected that the
17
initial belief will have significant impact on the results of the herding. As
predicted by the main theorem, the direction of the herding is unexpected,
and governed by the random actions of the agents.
Figure 6: 10 nodes networks used for the asynchronous dynamics.
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Figure 7: Opinion dynamics herding to 1 (top) and to 0 (bottom), xn(0) =
0.9, ∀n.
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